Can Affirmative Action Be Defended? by Issacharoff, Samuel
Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF*
In this Article, Samuel Issacharoff examines affirmative action and law
school admissions from his perspective as a member of the University of
Teas's defense team in the Hopwood case. By moving beyond the predominant
analytical framework and arguing that affirmative action programs justifiably
operate to consider race in admissions decisions, Professor Issacharofffocuses
on the compelling state interests furthered by racial considerations in the
admissions decisions of elite public universities. The Article concludes that the
tension created by the dual mission of public institutions of higher education-
meritocracy and integration of new elites-can only be resolved by taking
racial classifications into account in the application of modest, yet effective,
affirmative action programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
In October, 1992, I was summoned to the office of our then-Dean, Mark
Yudof. A lawsuit had just been filed against the Law School's affirmative action
program, and Dean Yudof wanted me to participate directly in the school's
defense. Prior to joining the faculty, I had amassed significant trial experience
as a civil rights lawyer, and these skills were deemed to be of value should we
have to navigate the untested waters of post-Bakke' higher education affirmative
action litigation. At the time, I was an assistant professor, only weeks away
from a faculty vote on my tenure. It was, in keeping with the best tradition of
Don Corleone, an offer that I could not refuse.
Before undertaking the defense of the Law School in the now famous
* Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I
am indebted to the individuals with whom I have spent a number of years working on these
issues, most notably my colleagues and co-counsel Charles Alan Wright and Douglas
Laycock, and the Vinson & Elkins lawyers leading the defense of the University of Texas
[hereinafter "UT," "Texas," or "Law School"] in the Hopwood litigation, particularly Harry
Reasoner, the fuim's managing partner. I also received helpful comments from Chandler
Davidson, Cynthia Esthnd, Mark Gergen, Pamela Karlan, Richard Pildes, David Rabban,
Michael Sharlot, and the participants in The Ohio State University College of Law's
Symposium on the legacy of Bakke. More than ever, given ongoing litigation, it is important
to stress that the views contained in this piece should not be attributed to anyone but myself,
with the exception of the extensive section I have drawn from my collaborative efforts with
Professors Wright and Laycock. I received valuable research assistance from Sasha Foster,
Carrie Jacobsohn, and Amy Pritchard.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium, Twenty Years After Bakke:
The Law and Social Sciences of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, The Ohio State
University College of Law, April 3-4, 1998.
1 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Hopwood 2 litigation, my contact with affirmative action in admissions was
scant. Like most faculty members, I knew that we had such a program and, as a
teacher of large first-year courses, I could readily discern when the program
worked well and when it failed to ensure comparable skill levels across the
incoming class. Also, like most faculty members, I was both aware of the
general goals-but-not-quotas mantra from Bakke and deeply suspicious of the
intellectual coherence of Justice Powell's opinion. In my prior writings on
affirmative action in the employment arena, I tried to draw a sharp distinction
between altering the unsecured aspirations of an entry-level pool and disrupting
the settled expectations of the seniority-vested incumbents. 3 In so doing, I had
tried to cabin race-conscious programs to allow for modest integration without
needlessly stoking the flames of resentment among the non-preferred. The line I
had drawn, paralleling that of the Supreme Court in the 1980s,4 focused on the
extent to which race preferences threatened positions to which affected whites
could claim some form of entitlement. But I, like most academics, had never
given serious consideration to the mechanisms by which race-based preferences
are actually implemented, particularly in the context of higher education.
In the pages that follow, I will attempt to give an account of what it means
to defend an affirmative action program as it is implemented in the real world.
Hopwood remains the only case in which the mechanics of such a program have
been taken to trial with an actual factual record and full discovery. As such, it
provides to the field an examination of both the legacy of Bakke and the
rationales for institutionalized affirmative action.
This will not be an exercise in the lawyer expos6s that have emerged as the
fashion of late. I remain deeply bound by attorney-client confidences in what is
still ongoing litigation. Moreover, the law school and university officials whom
I encountered during these years of litigation were people of good will who
sought the uncertain path between the competing values of exclusivity in the
commitment to a first-rate university and inclusivity in integrating the pathways
to the elite strata of the legal profession. The path they charted mirrored that of
most other comparable institutions and the tribulations of Hopwood
unfortunately show the deep vulnerability of the affirmative action programs
that came to root in the aftermath of Bakke.
2 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
3 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Wen Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks
and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
189 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (holding that a collectively-bargained lay-off provision that, during certain
school years, caused non-minority teachers to be laid off while minority teachers with less
seniority were retained, was violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
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II. BAKKE'S UNCERTAIN LEGACY: THE SUPPLY SIDE
A. Defining Affinnative Action
For reasons I shall develop later in this section, the debate over affirmative
action has been saddled with the analytic concepts inherited primarily from
Bakke, and to a lesser extent from the employment affirmative action cases of
the 1980s. These cases drew an analytic divide between what Justice Powell
decried as impermissible quotas and the more elusive, but acceptable, goals and
timetables pointing toward an integrative future. Critics of affirmative action
programs tried to score quick victories by decrying all race-conscious programs
as quota-driven and thereby triggering the constitutional prohibition inherited
from Bakke. Supporters of affirmative action denied charges of positions or
slots expressly set aside for minorities, and thereby sought the blessing
conferred by Justice Powell's favorable invocation of the Harvard Plan attached
as an appendix to the Bakke opinion.5
This battle of labels allowed the debate over affirmative action to take place
at a highly abstract level of first constitutional principles, one that in turn
cemented the role of Bakke in removing from the public eye the actual
mechanisms by which a mild form of purposeful integration of higher education
could proceed. Both sides in the debate had some interest in maintaining the
curious abstractness of the arguments for and against. Conservative critics of
affirmative action could claim to be nothing more than proponents of a color-
blind ideal without responsibility for the consequences of the wholesale
abandonment of affirmative action that their triumph would necessitate.
Defenders of affirmative action, on the other hand, could cling to what Deborah
Malamud has aptly characterized as "the polite silence that had for so long
made it possible simultaneously to support affirmative action and deny how
white our institutions would look without it." 6
It is therefore useful to begin with some clarity on terminology and other
preliminary matters. An affirmative action program in higher education is one
that accords preferences on the basis of a characteristic desired in the incoming
class, most notably on the basis of race or ethnicity. In some portion of cases,
the preference accorded along the lines of race or ethnicity is outcome
determinative. 7 Put simply, affirmative action alters the mix of applicants who
5 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
6 Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate,
95 MI-cH. L. REv. 1668-69 (1997).
7 Although this point is often obscured in the discussions of the complexities of
admissions processes, even Justice Powell in Bakke acknowledged that, at the margins,
preferences must be dispositive. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
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are admitted. As a result of affirmative action, some minorities are admitted
over some non-minorities who would have been admitted in the absence of an
affirmative action program. If this were not the case, what possible reason
would there be for academic institutions to engage in elaborate processes to
assess the racial and ethnic impact of their admissions practices? In functioning
affirmative action programs, these racial preferences exist independent of the
fact that the actual admissions decision may consider multiple factors. Whatever
the mix of factors to be considered in admissions, an affirmative action program
takes the variable of race and treats it in a distinct and independent fashion.8
Thus, while in a properly functioning affirmative action program no one is
admitted exclusively on the basis of race, racial considerations are, nonetheless,
a dichotomous variable in the admissions decision.
One of the first decisions made in defending UT was to be candid about
what affirmative action meant.9 As a state institution employing racial and
ethnic classifications in awarding a state-conferred benefit, this immediately
triggered exacting scrutiny. 10 Our decision to admit frankly the operation of the
8 This definition parallels that used by Deborah Malamud, a refreshingly candid writer
in a field heavily wanting for candor: "Preferences are, and are perceived as, the use of a
different set of selection criteria for whites than for minorities." Malamud, supra note 6, at
1694.
9 This was known colloquially as rejecting the "Georgetown defense." In 1991, a
student hostile to affirmative action improperly obtained some incoming credentials of the
Georgetown class. These data appeared to demonstrate a disparity in incoming credentials
between minority and non-minority students. See Robin Wilson, Article Critical of Black
Students' Qualifications Roils Georgetown U. Law Center, CHRON. OF HI-GmR EDUC., Apr.
24, 1991, at A33; Georgetown Law Student Disciplined, Will Graduate, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., May 29, 1991, at A2. This is exactly what would have been expected if indeed
Georgetown operated an affirmative action program, as it was required to do by AALS and
ABA guidelines, as well as by its own educational objectives. Rather than defend on the
merits, Georgetown claimed that the data were incomplete (which they very well may have
been) and that the data did not reflect the weight attributed to the essay portion of the
application. If indeed blacks did so clearly outperform whites on the essay section of the
exam, and if indeed this disparity yielded a continual representation of blacks at about twenty
percent of the incoming class, then Georgetown should have been put to some burden of
justifying the clear racial impact of each component of its admissions process. See Teal v.
Connecticut, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (rejecting "bottom line" defense in disparate impact
employment selection challenge). Under the bottom line defense, one argues that an
employer's acts of racial discrimination in promotions-affected by a procedure, such as an
examination, having a disparate impact-should "not render the employer liable for the racial
discrimination suffered by employees barred from promotion if the 'bottom line' result was
an appropriate racial balance." Id. I suspect that if this matter had been pressed in litigation,
Georgetown's denial of the obvious fact that it operated an affirmative action program would
not have survived the first deposition.
10 At the time the litigation began, there was caselaw that would have provided for
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program shifted the inquiry to the compelling interest that would justify such a
program. While that decision would ultimately have been inescapable in the
litigation context, it behooves any institution of higher education, particularly a
public university, to account for how it confers this important societal benefit.
At the very least, any program that seeks to survive litigation will eventually
have to meet the same standards.1
B. Implementing Affirmative Action
The first question that must be asked in defending an operating affirmative
action plan is what exactly Bakke means in operational terms. What is the real
difference between the Davis Plan condemned in Bakke and the Harvard Plan
that gained at least implicit approval from Justice Powell? As is well-known, the
Davis Plan was presented to the Court as setting aside a percentage of seats in
the incoming class for minority applicants. Harvard, by contrast, appeared to
have no such set-aside. Rather, Harvard spoke more generally of its objectives
intermediate levels of scrutiny for minority preference programs undertaken in conformity
with federal requirements. In Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n. v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419,
423-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991), for example, Judge Posner found that a
highway set-aside program undertaken pursuant to conditioned federal funds would transfer
the lower level of federal scrutiny of the federal government to the state entity. After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), however, that distinction ceased to be
meaningful because the same standards of strict scrutiny were applied to federal preference
programs.
11There is an interesting and as yet unexplored tension in the application of
constitutional standards to private schools. Under Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) and other leading Title VI cases, courts have made relatively
clear that the statutory prohibitions on racial considerations are intended to mirror those of the
Equal Protection Clause. A separate body of law, however, has held that Spending Clause
statutes must give potential recipients of federal funding unambiguous notice of the conditions
they assume when such funds are accepted before liability under such a statute may be
allowed. See Davis v. Monroe County Rd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997)
(requiring Congress to give clear notice under Title IX for school liability); Floyd v. Waiters,
133 F.3d 786, 792 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Spending Clause requires clear notice
under Title IX as to which employees would have enforcement authority). At least in the Title
IX context, this is now well-settled law. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S.
Ct. 1989, 1997-99 (1998). Since the implementing regulations of the Department of
Education clearly allow for Bakke-style affirmative action, the status of Title VI is still
unclear. It is also an issue whether the Spending Clause limitation applies to the capacity to
bring suit under an implied right of action or whether it is a prohibition on money damages.
A further unresolved question is whether Title VI is a Spending Clause statute-as was held
in Guardians Ass'. Some courts, however, including the district court in the remand of
Hopwood, held that the 1986 and 1987 recodifications transferred the statute's constitutional
authority to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1998]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
in attaining diversity and the representation of minority viewpoints in the
incoming class. This is the wellspring for the oft-repeated differences between
quotas and goals in admissions. A more careful look at the Harvard Plan,
however, calls into question the easy distinction offered in Bakke. Harvard
acknowledged that a certain level of black admissions was necessary to
overcome the effects of isolation and to achieve the real benefits of diversity, a
position with which I take no issue. What Harvard left unstated was how that
minimum level of necessary black representation was to be secured. If the
figure was five percent, as indicated in the Harvard appendix, then something
had to be done to achieve that figure-unless we are willing to engage in the
naive belief that this figure would be self-executing. The central difference
between Harvard and Davis, therefore, appears to be that Davis had a fixed
number of guaranteed minority admissions and used a separate waiting list of
contingent admittees, whereas Harvard provided for a guaranteed floor from
which black admissions would rise. In practice, however, the Harvard five-
percent floor would look very much like a set-aside that operates until that
figure is reached.
In assessing such programs, let me dispense with some objections that I
consider to be largely irrelevant to a realistic discussion of how affirmative
action programs operate. First, there is the objection that it is hard to identify
the operation of an affirmative action program because of the nuances of
individual considerations in selective admissions processes. It is certainly true
that the top tier of selective institutions weigh a wide range of factors in
admissions. Some of these reflect more nuanced understandings of the
predictive power of index scores derived from the LSAT and the undergraduate
GPA. (I will use law school admissions as the model because it is the world I
know best and is not uncharacteristic of affirmative action programs in higher
education.) So, for example, it is relevant to understanding the predictive power
of the LSAT whether the test taker took the LSAT once or multiple times;
similarly, it is relevant to understanding the achievement represented by a GPA
whether the applicant was an education major or a physics major and whether
the applicant went to MIT or a local community college. Moreover, selective
institutions routinely examine individual files to assess whether an applicant has
overcome personal adversity, has shown extraordinary achievement in some
interesting walk of life, or has in some other fashion demonstrated a capacity
for success not typically reflected in the standard incoming predictors. All that
being said, it remains the case that the Index scores generated by the LSAT and
GPA are a prime predictor of the likelihood of admission of any particular
applicant. At any selective institution, I would be astounded if it were not true
that as Index scores rise, so does the likelihood of admission. This may not hold
as true within the very narrow range from which the elite schools draw their
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applicants, but, if we can extrapolate from across the range of potential
applicants, it is indisputable that Index scores do serve their intended purposes-
to sort out applicants for admission as the crucial threshold variable. Moreover,
I would venture that this is no less true in the operation of an affirmative action
program. Although I have seen no data on this point, my guess would be that
the predictive power of the Index score on the likelihood of a minority
candidate's admission would be no less than the predictive power of the Index
score in an Anglo candidate's admission. The difference would be in where on
the Index scale the admissions fell; my strong hunch is that the minority
candidate with higher Index scores would be every bit as likely as the white
candidate with higher Index scores to be a statistical favorite for admission
relative to the minority or non-minority candidates with respectively lower
Index scores.
Second, there is no basis for believing that the high representation of
minorities is operating independent of the conscious design of affirmative action
programs. This is the clear message of the pivotal study by Linda Wightman
based on the historic records of the Law School Admission Service. 12 This is
consistent with the trial record in Hopwood, which showed that "[h]ad the law
school based its 1992 admissions solely on the applicants' [Index credentials]
without regard to race or ethnicity, the entering class would have included, at
most, nine blacks and eighteen Mexican Americans."1 3 This is further
confirmed by the experience at UCLA, Boalt Hall, and Texas, the three top-tier
law schools that were forced to abandon race-conscious admissions practices in
the wake of Hopwood and Proposition 209. Each faced an immediate and
calamitous drop in black admissions. 14
The foregoing calls into question Bakke's assumption that a fluid admissions
12 See Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1997) (finding that an admissions policy that relied solely
on LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages would result in a sharp increase in
the number of minority applicants denied admission).
13 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
14 Thus I remain embarrassed by the claim, not of my authoring but with my name
attached nonetheless, that appeared in our reply brief in support of certiorari in Hopwood. In
an act of abdication, the brief senselessly retreated from our trial strategy of admitting the role
of racial preferences in the UT affirmative action program but defended on the basis of the
compelling interest behind those programs. Instead the brief argued that race operated as
simply one of many criteria that went into a selection process-a claim that could not be
substantiated by the record and did not comport with the reality of how affirmative action
works. Not without reason did Justice Ginsberg quote from our reply brief to question
whether the State had any interest in actually defending its program. See Texas v. Hopwood,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., denying certiorari).
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process could yield a significant minority (or more specifically black) level of
representation under a system in which race operated only at the margin and
was not part of a systematized form of selection. Bakke failed to account for
how dramatic and how persistent the pool problem is. It also failed to take into
account the realities of institutionalized practices. Thus, on the supply side of
the equation, Bakke had an unrealistic sense of the extent to which race-
consciousness is required, even to achieve the Harvard minimum floor of
minority representation. This is the most difficult factual issue for the defenders
of affirmative action. Conservative critics of affirmative action, such as my
colleague Lino Graglia, routinely score points in debates by bringing forth the
comparable statistics reflecting the disparity in credentials that emerge from
some of the more aggressive affirmative action programs. When they do not
shoot themselves in the foot with reckless musings on the cultural attributes of
the various racial and ethnic groups, these critics play on the obvious discomfort
of affirmative action supporters in confronting the credentials gap. 15 As evident
in the experience of UT, Boalt Hall, and UCLA, the credentials gap indicates
the need for continued affirmative action if minority (and most specifically
black) enrollment at the elite schools is to be maintained. 16 Unfortunately, the
experience at these schools also demonstrates how central racial considerations
must be for an affirmative action program to bear fruit.
15 See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONs (1992) (documenting the gaps between
white and black college applicants and frankly discussing his discomfort with the persistence
of this problem). But see Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, America's Next
Achievement Test: Closing the Black-White Test Score Gap, Tm AM. PROspEcr, Sept.-Oct.
1998, at 44 (accepting the challenge of persistent testing disparities and evaluating successful
mechanisms for closing the gulf).
161 leave aside the more radical critiques of any reliance upon predictors of law school
performance. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Recla ming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 968 (1996) (arguing that standardized testing is
not only culturally biased, but also of questionable validity). In the first instance, I think the
historical critique against such objective measures disregards the real impact of such criteria
in opening up the elite institutions to a non-inherited class of occupants. See DANmL A.
FARBER & SuZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON (1997) (documenting radical
transformation in composition of elite institutions over the course of the twentieth century as
admission by bloodline gave way to admission by objective criteria). Second, there is ample
evidence of the usefulness of the Index scores in law school admissions in terms of predicting
at least first-year performance. See Wightman, supra note 12, at 31-34. Finally, my
experience in education confirms what a colleague with many years in undergraduate
admissions aptly and colloquially expressed: "These scores don't tell you everything; but they
certainly don't tell you nothing."
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IH. BAKKE'S UNCERTAIN LEGACY: THE DEMAND SIDE
If institutions of higher education routinely rely on affirmative action to
sustain minority enrollments, and if such programs require express racial
considerations, what legal justifications can protect such programs from the
equal treatment mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964? This is the problem of what I will term the demand
side of the affirmative action equation. If affirmative action is necessary to
enhance the supply-side pool of minority potential enrollees, what justifies
institutions of higher education in drawing from this pool? While Bakke struck
down the use of set-asides to guarantee predetermined minority slots, Justice
Powell was careful not to prohibit all use of race-consciousness in an admissions
program. Instead, Bakke held out the prospect that the needs of vaguely-defined
diversity and an ongoing obligation to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination might provide the compelling justifications for a race-conscious
admissions process. But, it is important to emphasize that Bakke, or more
precisely, Justice Powell, addressed these concerns only in the abstract since
each justification was either absent or not presented in Davis's defense of its
medical school set-asides. The issue left untested until Hopwood was how these
justifications would fare in the litigation context when their actual
implementation was under challenge.
A. Diversity
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that affirmative action cannot be
designed to achieve racial balance for its own sake. 17 Rather, the pursuit of
greater racial diversity must be designed directly to enhance the product or
mission of the institution in important ways. A clear example is in the use of
racial preferences for boot-camp officers supervising young criminals
undergoing shock incarceration. 18 Product enhancement is also clear in higher
education since it adds otherwise unrepresented or underrepresented views and
experiences to the intellectual mix. In fact, one of the clear legacies of Bakke
has been to enshrine the term "diversity" within the legal lexicon to cover
17 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496, 503-06 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (plurality
opinion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
18 See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918-20 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
949 (1997) (examining racial composition of inmates and staff and holding that preference
given to black male applicants for lieutenant's job over white males did not violate equal
protection because black inmates were believed unlikely to play "correctional game of brutal
drill sergeant and brutalized recruit" unless some of the blacks held positions of authority).
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everything from curricular enrichments to thinly-veiled set-asides.
The problem with diversity as a justification for a challenged affirmative
action program is that it is an almost incoherent concept to operationalize,
unless diversity means a predetermined number of admittees from a desired
group. How would one go about putting into place an admissions system that
effectively sought to create diversity within the final incoming class? Taking as
an example the institution that I know best, the difficulties quickly emerge.
Thus, at the University of Texas School of Law, somewhere between 3,000 and
5,000 applications are received each year. These have to be processed in
essentially a one-month period. To get at the most attractive applicants, an
admissions office must be able to mobilize to contact prospective enrollees in a
fiercely competitive market. Even without the additional fact of top minority
students being among the most highly sought after applicants, there is simply no
way that an admissions process can realistically evaluate each applicant against
the entire pool to determine that applicant's contribution to diversity. Instead,
selective institutions must approach the applicant pool with predetermined
notions of what an appropriately balanced incoming class should look like.
This is not a matter of laziness or bureaucratic indifference, but rather
reflects a fundamental tenet of organizational theory that institutions cannot
proceed without clear objectives. By its terms, the Bakke conception of diversity
seems to indulge precisely this unrealistic expectation that each applicant file
will be considered against all the others in the pool. Justice Powell's opinion
reads as if the process of selecting applicants was endlessly fluid and that
institutional actors could reconsider each file against the entire pool so as to
make incremental judgments about a particular applicant's contribution to the
overall objective of diversity. Even assuming that diversity has a meaning that
all would agree to, and that it could be applied across the different fields of
academia, no competitive admissions system could be guided by this imprecise
a course of action.
The most obvious, and relatively secondary, problem with this account is
that no school has a 100% yield rate. So, even if a school were inclined to
follow Justice Powell's invitation, there is no realistic prospect that the pool of
admittees would translate into the diverse class come enrollment time.
Moreover, given the extraordinary competition for the relatively few minorities
in the competitive applicant pool, this diversity of the pool strategy is unlikely to
translate into real diversity in the incoming class. To be successful, a minority
recruitment strategy must over-admit relative to diversity demands lest it be shut
out at enrollment time. 19
19 A small indication of this problem is provided by the incoming statistics at Boalt Hall
and UT law schools for the 1997 incoming class. Without race conscious admissions, UT
admitted eleven blacks and managed to enroll four. Boalt Hall admitted nine and enrolled
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But the more significant problem is that diversity has very little to say about
how an admissions process works. If a school wants to target ten percent black
enrollment, to pick an arbitrary number, how would it go about getting there in
the absence of fixed objectives? Clearly it cannot do so on the diversity
rationale, unless diversity is defined in a predetermined fashion along
percentage lines. Each additional black enrollee brings diminishing marginal
returns in terms of racial diversity. The first black admitted under affirmative
action may bring significant diversity, and perhaps this is true even of the black
admittee who brings the size of the class to Harvard's minimum of five percent
required so as to overcome the negative effects of isolation. But how much
diversity is added beyond that point, and how is it measured against the first
Alaskan resident, or Christian fundamentalist, or Vietnamese immigrant, or
former soap opera star, etc.?
The simple fact is that no admissions program operates in this fashion.
Rather, these programs operate along three tracks. First, they admit applicants
who have the most reliable indicators of past performance from whom one can
hope, per Shakespeare, that "the past is prologue." Second, they admit targets
that would not be generated in sufficient numbers by the first track. Finally,
they apply looser, more subjective standards of "interestingness" or non-
traditional achievement to a range of applicants deemed desirable, but not
indispensable. The diversity rationale helps explain the third set of admissions
decisions-in the real world of affirmative action, the bulk of targeted minority
admittees comes from the second tier. To admit desired minorities from the
third tier alone would require an institutional willingness to accept that in any
given year the numbers may fluctuate wildly, including down to zero. Given the
centrality of the institutional commitment to maintaining black enrollment at
elite institutions, this is not generally seen as an acceptable outcome-and
institutional policies, most specifically targeted admissions, are the result.
B. Overcoming Past Discrimination
While the affirmative action caselaw condemns the use of racial preferences
as an abstract compensatory cure for societal discrimination, there is
nonetheless a clear role for race consciousness in the remedial setting where
none; its only black enrollee was a student who had deferred admission from the prior year.
This fact received extensive media coverage. See Amy Wallace, Fallout From UC
Preferences Ban, L.A. TIMEs, June 28, 1997, at Al; Amy Wallace, UC Law School Class
May Have Only 1 Black, L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at Al; Michelle Locke, Black Law
Students Hurt By Affirmative Action Ban, TBE DENvER PosT, July 12, 1997, at A4; Kenneth
R. Weiss, UCLaw Schools' New Rules Cost Minority Spots, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at
Al; Peter Applebome, Minority Law School Enrollment Plunges In California & Texas,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at Al.
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courts have found unlawful segregation.20 As with the diversity rationale,
however, the issue of the scope of voluntary affirmative action remains quite
unclear. The Supreme Court has both embraced the need to have institutions
voluntarily bring themselves into compliance with the civil rights laws, even in
the absence of a direct showing of discriminatory behavior,21 and expressed
increasing ambivalence about the political decisions that would lead institutions
to embrace express racial considerations in official policies.22
As applied to higher education, there is a significant body of law, beginning
with Bakke itself, that allows affirmative action not only as a remedy for the
present effects of past discrimination, but as an affirmative duty where the racial
identifiability of previously segregated institutions persists. 23 This issue remains
highly relevant in public higher education. A number of educational institutions
in the Deep South are still operating under consent decrees arising from the
Adams litigation. 24 Texas, for example, entered into a consent decree with the
Department of Education in 1983 under threat of a cessation of all federal
funding for education. This consent decree was operationalized in a series of
"Texas Plans" that provided for specific objectives in minority recruitment,
subject to continuing federal oversight.25 For state institutions subject to such
federal oversight, affirmative action is an integral part of remedying the present
effects of prior discriminatory exclusion. In no walk of civil rights law have
courts required or even accepted remedies for racial exclusion that did not
2 0 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-86 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(holding that a one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement survived strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause).
21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1987) (holding
that, in order to justify its voluntary adoption of an affirmative action plan, an employer need
not point to its own prior discriminatory practices, but merely to a conspicuous imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories).
22 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (noting
the majority black composition of the Richmond City Council that adopted minority set-asides
in public contracting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to all race-based preferences, regardless of federal government participation).
23 See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 733-38 (1992) (finding that Mississippi's
college admissions policy, which had required higher ACT scores for historically white
universities than for historically black universities, had present discriminatory effects)
(emphasis added).
24 See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court's
consent decree to bring the North Carolina higher education system into compliance with
Tide VI). The Adams litigation was eventually dismissed sub nomine Women's Equity Action
League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990). But this dismissal of plaintiffs' claims
for further relief did not affect the consent decrees with southern universities, which had been
spun off from the Adams litigation. See id. at 746-47 n.4.
25 See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555-57 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
[Vol. 59:669
CAN AFFIRMATIVE A CTION BE DEFENDED?
consider race in crafting appropriate attempts to undo the prior segregative
practice. It is inconceivable that any race-blind measure could come close to
accomplishing such an objective without undermining all other functioning of
the institution.
The ongoing obligations of desegregation were a cornerstone of the defense
of UT in Hopwood. We were able to persuade the trial court that the vestiges of
discrimination were not merely the lore of a bygone era. At the time of the
Hopwood trial, desegregation litigation continued in more than forty Texas
school districts,26 and a majority of the in-state applicant pool to UT Law
School in 1992 attended public schools that were still deemed dejure segregated
by supervising federal courts. 27 Although this was ultimately rejected by the
Fifth Circuit28-which held that only discrimination by the exact governmental
unit was relevant-the broader fact is that this defense is not available to most of
the institutions of higher education that engage in affirmative action.
Even beyond the limited number of institutions that could conceivably claim
to be affirmatively engaged in remedying actual discrimination, the remedial
argument has significant vulnerabilities in the litigation context. First, as is
evident in the panel opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, it is highly
unlikely in this day and age that the institutions of higher education that have
heavily internalized a commitment to affirmative action are at the same time
remedying their own discrimination. Even in the public education context, the
court in Hopwood found there to be an insufficient nexus between ongoing lack
of minority educational opportunity in the K-12 context, and attempts at
remedial admissions at the law school level. Second, the remedial argument
puts a great deal of pressure on the apparent mismatch between those
individuals who have borne the brunt of inadequate educational opportunity in
the past and the likely beneficiaries of such programs in the present. Whereas
the former are likely to be poor, under-educated, and ill-prepared for the rigors
of elite higher educational institutions, the latter are quite likely to be the
children of the middle-class whose families have benefited from the fruits of the
civil rights revolution.29 Moreover, when the affirmative action program in
question concerns that highly rarefied world of admissions to elite professional
schools, the pool from which potential affirmative action admittees are drawn is
national in scope-thereby further weakening the link between the site of
educational disadvantage and the residence of potential beneficiaries. Thus, in
26 See id. at 554.
27 See id. at 573 (finding continued impact on the applicant pool and citing to further
details in trial record).
28 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
29 This point is most forcefully made in WunIAM JuuIus WILSON, THE TRuLY
DISADvANTAGED: TH INNER Criy, ThE UNDERCLASS, AND PuBUc PoLIcY 112-18 (1987).
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Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit found that the heavy recruitment of black students
from outside Texas was further reason to discredit the remedial defense put
forward by the University. 30
I do not consider these objections to the remedial argument by any means
dispositive. Lack of educational opportunity for minorities in a state such as
Texas, which is pushing 40% black and Mexican-American, punishes not only
the victims of that educational deficit. Rather, it robs the state of political and
intellectual leadership from those communities, thwarts the development of a
more robust minority middle class from which future competitive applicants
should come, and perpetuates the racial and ethnic dimensions of a
socioeconomic divide that arose heavily imbued with noxious state action.
While such considerations would not satisfy the narrow remedial vision of the
Hopwood panel opinion, they appear more in keeping with Supreme Court
precedents in cases such as Johnson v. Transportation Agency 31 and United
States v. Fordice.32 The main point, however, is to emphasize the real
vulnerability of the Bakke rationale when under an as-applied challenge.
IV. RECASTING THE DEBATE
What then is really at issue in affirmative action? I believe it is not captured
by either the diversity argument or the claim to be remedying present effects of
past discrimination. Rather, affirmative action represents a point of compromise
in the contradictory missions of the elite universities. They serve as both the
guardians of a meritocratic vision of achievement and as the guarantors of
opportunity so that the elites of the society may be replenished from the diverse
groups that have built this country. Affirmative action grows out of the
frustration with the apparent intractability of this country's inability to achieve
these twin objectives with regard to black Americans. It is a pragmatic and
oftentimes messy accommodation of two of the central values of higher
education. While elements of this argument can be read back into Bakke's
invocation of diversity and remediation as the justifications for affirmative
action, the fit is far from perfect. To begin with, the focus on accommodation
30 A particularly pejorative denunciation of this argument was recently formulated by
Michael Greve, the Director of the Center for Individual Rights, which represented some of
the plaintiffs in Hopwood. Per Greve, "the University of Texas pointed to sustained
discrimination in Texas elementary schools... and argued that therefore the law school
should be permitted to import two dozen black out-of-state students under preferential
admissions standards." Michael Greve, The Vanity of Diversity, THE WKLY. STANDARD,
July 20, 1998 at 26, 28 (emphasis in original).
31 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
32 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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of competing missions is far too institutionally-oriented to fit squarely within the
narrow remedial jurisprudence to which Bakke adheres. Similarly, the focus on
competing institutional and societal aims is far more qualified than the first-
order claims for diversity advanced in the aftermath of Bakke.
This approach requires a certain degree of doctrinal overhauling. At the
very least, it would require some softening of the rhetoric of Bakke and cases
such as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,33 which appear to deny to
major societal institutions the capacity to mediate between these conflicting
objectives. 34 This argument was developed in an arnicus brief in Piscataway
Township Board of Education v. Taxman,35 written by Charles Alan Wright,
Douglas Laycock, and me.36 Taxman was scheduled to present the Supreme
Court with its first education-based affirmative action case since Bakke, until it
settled through the financial intervention of justifiably concerned civil rights
groups. As academics and as lawyers involved in Hopwood, our concern was
that Taxman presented a curious fact pattern through which to judge affirmative
action. The case concerned the employment prospects of equally credentialed
teachers in the layoff context and did not present any of the conventional
concerns over remediation or diversity in the educational product. But beyond
that, the amicus brief was intended to expose the Court to the mediating role
that affirmative action could play in higher education. Moreover, as revisited at
length in Jeffrey Rosen's insightful article in The New Yorker on the effect of
Proposition 209, we wanted to show the Court the potential consequences of a
simple-minded abandonment of all affirmative action.37
The gist of the argument is that affirmative action allows institutions of
higher education to mediate between the competing claims of exclusivity and
opportunity for group advancement, particularly with regard to black
Americans. Our argument is, at bottom, a pragmatic one that claims that absent
some sensible mediation, the dual role of the university is placed at deep risk.
The central tenets of the argument correspond heavily to the subsequent, well-
publicized defense of affirmative action by the long-time critic of such
programs, Nathan Glazer.38 Because our brief has prompted significant
33 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
34 See id. at 283-84.
35 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), and cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
36 Brief of Charles Alan Wright, Douglas Laycock, and Samuel Issacharoff as Amici
Curiae in support of Respondent, Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 91 F.3d
1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 96-679) available in 1997 WL 626055 [hereinafter Amici Brief].
37 See Jeffrey Rosen, Damage Control, THE NEw YoRKER, Feb. 23, 1998, at 58.38 See Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, THE NEw REP Buc, Apr. 6, 1998, at
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coverage in its own right, I will reproduce with only mild editing (and with the
indulgence of my more senior colleagues) the core of the argument that makes
the point about the role of affirmative action with regard to public institutions in
general, and the University of Texas in particular. I will then expand this to
apply to higher education more broadly.
A. Affirmative Action and the Mission of the Public University
The great public universities in this country must of necessity pursue
multiple and partially conflicting missions. The University of Texas at Austin,
as an elite public institution in a populist state, is as clear an example as can be
imagined. The academic goals of excellence in teaching and research require the
flagship public universities to be highly selective in their admission of students.
At the same time, they are public institutions that must serve, and be seen to
serve, all the people of the state. Public education is part of the process by
which skills and credentials are created and cannot be simply a reward for pre-
existing skills and credentials, many of them created at earlier stages of the
public education system.
Because of this dual orientation, public universities have historically
provided a principal path by which talented citizens of modest means join the
elites of American society. Consequently, they have been a principal
mechanism for integrating racial and ethnic minorities. These public universities
have been an indispensable mechanism for successive waves of immigrants to
become part of the mainstream of American society. This integrative function is
especially important in law schools, which train a disproportionate share of the
future political leadership of the state and nation. Unfortunately, this pathway to
integration has been least available to those Americans who have borne the
greatest brunt of official and private discrimination in the provision of education
and other public goods-most especially black Americans everywhere and
Mexican-Americans in the Southwest.
There is no escaping the tension between exclusivity to preserve high
academic standards and inclusivity to offer advancement and integration into
American society. Affirmative action has been the one successful mechanism
that allowed elite public institutions to pursue both commitments. Only
affirmative action permits a school to admit the very best white students and
also the very best black and Mexican-American students in more than token
numbers. Achieving the twin aims of public higher education is a compelling
state interest that should be allowed to justify the appropriately limited use of
racial classifications.
As the data set forth below illustrate, a modest preference in admissions can
produce large gains in the public university's ability to serve its integrative
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mission, without significant cost to its pursuit of excellence. No other method
achieves both missions. The only color-blind substitute for affirmative action is
to lower admission standards generally with the goal of increasing the number
of minority students in the admissible pool. But no incremental lowering of
admissions standards will solve the problem. There are more students of all
races at every level of entering credentials than at the level just above it. This
means that even a modest reduction of admission standards creates many more
admissible students than the school can accommodate. Most of these surplus
students will be white. There are minority candidates at every level of entering
credentials, but at each level, there are many more white applicants. To admit
from this larger pool without relying on the credentials that tend to exclude
minority applicants requires admission by lottery or by some subjective,
unreliable, and certainly less reviewable method such as interviews.
The risk of misunderstanding is great, so let us be perfectly clear even at
the risk of redundancy. There are qualified minority students who can succeed
at elite professional schools and whose admission has no significant effect on
intellectual standards. These are the students admitted pursuant to well-designed
affirmative action plans. The insuperable difficulty is that we cannot target those
students without taking race into account. The following chart, taken from the
1997 resident applicant pool to the University of Texas School of Law shows
that simply dipping lower into the pool would not alter the predicted number of
minority applicants:
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF RESIDENT APPLICANT POOL
INDEX SCORE ANGLO BLACK MEX.-AM OTHER
196 & up 83% 0.9% 4.1% 12%
191 &up 83% 1.0% 5.2% 11%
185 &up 80% 1.5% 7.5% 11%
1997-98 enrolled: 0.9% 5.6%
Thus, if UT were to admit by lottery at the qualifications level of these
students, the lottery would draw only a few of the available minorities at that
level, because there are also many white applicants at that level. For a lottery or
similar admission standard to significantly change the number of minorities
admitted, the threshold for entry into the lottery must be set low enough that the
underrepresentation of minorities at the very highest levels of credentials no
longer skews the racial makeup of the pool as a whole. 39 It becomes a simple
39 Nor is it clear that this approach would have the effect of significantly increasing
minority admissions. To a large extent, the pool of applicants is self-selected as a result of the
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matter of mathematics that the threshold for entry into the lottery must be far
below the current boundary-zone between admissible and inadmissible students.
To use such methods is necessarily to admit many students of all races from
the lower ranges of the pool and to exclude many students of all races who are
more qualified than those admitted-and with only modest increases in minority
representation. In the present circumstances of public education, for a lottery to
achieve more than token representation of minority students in the most
selective academic units would require admitting by lottery from a pool that
reaches far below the current minimum standards for admissions. Even here,
given the continued disparity in representation in the applicant pool, the increase
in minority represektation will continue to be uncertain, while the diminution of
the academic caliber of the student body as a whole will be inescapable.
A university that pursued this course would no longer be a great university.
Its student body would be much weaker than before and its curriculum would
necessarily have to be adapted to the new student body. Faculty recruitment and
retention, and ultimately budgets, would come under similar pressure. Having
lost the students and faculty that made them special, the flagship public
universities would no longer have any special claim to funds, whether from
appropriations, tuition, or research grants.
The great research universities have contributed important advances to
human knowledge, to economic development, to national defense, and to public
health. Nearly every state has created one or more flagship universities with
competitive admissions and a strong commitment to research, and other public
universities, colleges, and junior colleges with less competitive or
noncompetitive admissions and less emphasis on research. This allocation of
functions is so widespread because it serves compelling interests. But, without
affirmative action, the flagship public universities must either abandon their
comnmitment to selective admissions, with all that that entails, or they must
abandon their commitment to public education's integrative and service
functions. Modest affirmative action plans, subject to the judicially enforceable
limits discussed below, are the least restrictive means of pursuing both
missions.
The reality is that flagship public universities cannot pursue either of their
missions unless they pursue both of them. The costs of ending affirmative action
will not be borne by only one of the competing missions. In the short run,
color-blind admissions will produce flagship schools that are overwhelmingly
white, or in some cases, white and Asian. But that is only a transitional
publication of information about admission prospects. As soon as knowledge that a high-
ranking school was prepared to engage in lottery admissions, the pool would no longer be as
constricted. Many non-minorities who presently do not apply because of the remote chance of
admission would presumably recalculate the odds of gaining admission.
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consequence, because it is not sustainable. Barring a miraculous improvement
in elementary and secondary education for minority students, color-blind
admissions will soon produce either public universities without competitive
admissions, public universities without adequate funds, or both. Either way, the
end of affirmative action is a formula for the destruction of the great public
universities.
If affirmative action is ended, inevitable political, economic, and legal
forces will pressure the great public universities to lower admission standards as
far as necessary to avoid resegregation. This reduction of academic standards in
response to the end of affirmative action is already happening. In response to
Hopwood, the Texas legislature passed two bills to reduce admissions standards.
One guarantees admission to any public university in Texas to any student who
graduates in the top ten percent of his high school class, without regard to what
courses he took or his performance on standardized tests.40 The idea is to make
standardized tests irrelevant and to make a virtue of segregated high schools,
guaranteeing admission to ten percent of the students in such schools. No one
knows what consequences this experiment will have. It may swamp more
selective universities with students, and it may displace more qualified students
who graduated in the second ten percent at stronger high schools or after taking
a more challenging high school curriculum. Certainly, it creates powerful
incentives for high school students to avoid challenging courses.41
The second new Texas statute requires Texas universities to use the same
minimum grade-point average (if any) for all applicants, including scholarship
athletes. 42 If generalized, this bill would require either something very close to
open admissions and an inundating tide of students, or the end of Division I
football and basketball and the risk-which hardly any university administration
has been willing to run-of sharp reductions in alumni support. For now, the
University of Texas believes it is outside the scope of this draconian legislation
because it does not require a minimum grade-point average.
Each of these initiatives is entirely consistent with the opinion of the court
of appeals in Hopwood. No one is defying the court, and we are not suggesting
that rights must yield because of public disagreement with them. Nor is the
destruction of the great public universities like an in terrorem threat to close
public schools in the face of desegregation. The great public universities would
40 See TEx. EDUc. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West Supp. 1998).
4 1 The University of California is considering a similar but less drastic proposal. A Task
Force has recommended that the University no longer require undergraduate applicants for
admission to report standardized test scores, and the Regents are now considering this
recommendation. See U. of California Weighs Optional S.A.T. 's, N.Y. IMES, Sept. 21,
1997, at 32.
42 See Tmc. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.9245 (West Supp. 1998).
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not be closed; they would be gradually transformed into sometling entirely
different.
The resegregation of the great public universities resulting from the end of
affirmative action would be immediate and highly visible; the destruction caused
by lowered admission standards would be gradual, mostly in the future, and less
visible even as it comes to pass. Those who supported the bills to lower
admission standards were acting in what they honestly conceived to be the best
interest of public higher education in Texas. Certainly, no one is consciously
threatening to destroy the great public universities. But that is where we are
headed under the rule of Hopwood. If that case becomes law for the nation,
there will eventually be no great public universities-not for the nation, and not
for the white plaintiffs either. If similar requirements of color-blindness are
extended to the great private universities under Title VI, they would face the
same destructive choice of rapid resegregation or dramatic reduction in
admission standards and overall quality. Appropriately limited affirmative
action is the least restrictive means to avoid this choice and to preserve the great
universities.
B. Private Universities
The foregoing discussion of the role of the flagship public research
universities describes only a fraction of the extensive public higher education
system in the United States. That focus is entirely appropriate because it is these
front-rank institutions and their graduate and professional schools that have
selective admissions programs and affirmative action programs as well. Second-
tier public institutions, ranging from junior colleges and community colleges to
commuter campuses and regionally-based, four-year schools, simply do not
maintain the same level of student selectivity as to trigger the concerns in the
affirmative action debate.
Restricting the comparison to the elite strata of private universities and the
first-tier public universities reveals a fundamental overlap in the role these
institutions play. Essentially all are heavily geared toward research; all are
heavily dependent on governmental funding in terms of grants and student
financial assistance; all contract directly with governmental entities; and all
provide access to their students into the higher echelons of society. Indeed,
except for the direct public subsidies of the public universities, there is little that
distinguishes a Berkeley from a Stanford, and so on down the ladder of
selectivity.
But the comparison is more fundamental than the financial support from the
state, or even the overlaps between the legal commands of the Fourteenth
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Amendment and Title VI.43 All these universities play a distinct role in
transmitting the knowledge and values of the society across generations and, at
least since the advent of selective admissions, in allowing for new groups to
replenish the elite strata of society. The special mission of the university has
been recognized, at least tacitly, in the Supreme Court's occasional discussions
of the value of academic freedom.44 In Bakke, Justice Powell also invoked the
First Amendment as a consideration in protecting some latitude for the
universities to shape their admissions systems. In my view, this should not be
seen as a free pass for universities to disregard legal commands that would
apply elsewhere. Rather, the invocation of the First Amendment, drawn against
the backdrop of prior recognition of academic freedom as a corresponding
constitutional value, should mean that legal regulation must recognize the public
role of the great universities.
Ultimately, context matters. Higher education is not municipal contracting,
just as hiring is not firing, just as the disadvantages facing black Americans are
not the same as those facing new immigrants. The pragmatic argument for
allowing some race-consciousness in higher education admissions is just that: a
pragmatic compromise to mediate the competing demands made on the great
universities. It is further noteworthy, as chronicled in the large-scale recent
study by William G. Bowen and Derek Bok,45 that the integrative functions of
affirmative action are strongly reproduced in the post-graduate successes of elite
school alumni-from both the public and private universities. To the extent that
the functional defense of affirmative action can succeed, to the extent that a
legal defense can be based on the pragmatic accommodation of competing
values in the mission of the first-tier academic institutions, that defense appears
to apply to all the first-tier institutions, public or private.
43 Title VI extends the non-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment to all
educational institutions that receive federal funding for any institutional program, from
research to federal guarantees of student loans.
44 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967). For academic treatment of the important values underlying academic freedom, see
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 227 (1990) and J. Peter
Byme, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendnent," 99 YALE L.J. 251
(1989).
45 See Ethan Bronner, Study Strongly Supports Affirmative Action in Admissions to Elite
Colleges, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 9, 1998, at A24 (reviewing a study of affirmative action in
higher education by William G. Bowen and Derek Bok).
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V. WHAT SHOULD BE PEMISSIBLE?
In our amicus brief,46 we propose a legal standard that seeks to
accommodate the real concerns about unbounded affirmative action programs,
while at the same time recognizing the real consequences of resegregation that
would ensue under the harsh rationale of Hopwood. Our proposal follows.
A. The Magnitude of the Preference
At least since United Steelworkers v. Weber,47 the Supreme Court has
emphasized that, in order to be lawful, racial preferences must be modest in
scope.48 Justice Powell had made a similar point in his opinion in Bakke.49
Unfortunately, the higher-education community and some judicial opinions
interpreted Justice Powell's test to make constitutionality depend upon
procedural mechanisms that conceal the actual workings of the affirmative
action plan. This emphasis has made affirmative action more cumbersome and
inefficient without imposing any real limits.
The magnitude of the racial preference is far more important to the
legitimate interests of applicants than the details of administration. If it were
possible to use racial preferences smaller than the margin of error in the
measures used to predict academic success, then the amount of disruption of the
interests of the non-preferred would be very small because such a preference
would serve essentially as just a tie-breaking mechanism. Unfortunately, more
than just tie-breaking is needed to get more than token minority representation
in elite academic programs. But an appropriate affirmative action plan would
limit preferences to a magnitude that is modest in proportion to the whole
distribution of qualifications and that is consistent with a prospect of reasonable
success for the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Universities could define a
"modest" preference in ways that are readily administrable and judicially
reviewable; for example, the preference could be limited to one standard
deviation,50 or even a fraction of a standard deviation, on the primary
admissions predictor. There may be many other ways to specify a limit. The
point here is simply that the magnitude of the preference should be a central
46 See supra note 36.
47 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
48 See id. at 208.
49 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978).
50 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (using
corresponding statistical thresholds and adopting a two standard deviation rule for
employment discrimination claims).
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issue. It has been a mistake to equate differences of fifty percentiles in Bakke,51
with two points on a scored interview in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,52
and it would be a mistake to equate tie-breaking within a statistical margin of
error with unlimited preferences in some other case.
B. The Magnitude of the Program
Except in the most circumscribed remedial settings, 53 the Supreme Court's
review of affirmative action has always presumed that such preference
programs would operate on the margin of established selection criteria. Thus, in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the candidates were evaluated under
established selection criteria; the preference given to the first female applicant
for a road-maintenance supervisory position was administered after the
candidates had been evaluated on these criteria, and, as noted above, the
preference was a small fraction of a total derived from the established criteria. 54
This is far different from a program in which predetermined "diversity points"
are given to all applicants and form part of the central selection criteria or in
which "race norming" of applicant scores makes any cross-group comparisons
impossible. In such circumstances, the fear of racial "balkanization" is most
pronounced. 55 "Modest programs are less intrusive not simply because they are
less visible, but because they allow the vast majority of applicants to rest secure
in believing that the customary returns to achievement, perseverance, and merit
will be honored." 56
C. No Permanent Pursuit of Racial Balance
Affirmative action must have an endpoint. It is not a permanent source of
special treatment, and the Supreme Court has long said that it cannot be used
merely to achieve racial balance for its own sake.57 Afortiori affirmative action
cannot continue in institutions where minorities have actually become
overrepresented, as appears to have been the case in the highly contentious
litigation over teacher preferences in Piscataway. But where egregious
51 See 438 U.S. at 277 n.7.
52 480 U.S. 616, 625 (1987).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
54 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641-42.
55 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993) (condemning redistricting that
excessively relies on race, and finding that, in gauging the extent of permissible racial
considerations, "appearances do matter").
56 Amici Brief, supra note 36, at *18.
57 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.).
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underrepresentation of minorities hampers an institution's ability to perform its
mission, affirmative action emerges as the only solution. On the other hand, the
need for a limiting principle, for'an end-point that will prevent affirmative
action programs from becoming institutionalized as a racial spoils system,
reveals another difficulty with resting the defense of affirmative action primarily
on the diversity justification. Because diversity emerges as an end in its own
right in the post-Bakke world, its rationale argues for permanence as a feature of
educational life-a goal that appears highly vulnerable under current equal
protection law.58
D. Clearly Defined and Verifiable Objectives
This relates back to the extensive discussion earlier of the permissible
objectives in affirmative action. While the pre-Hopwood caselaw recognizes
both the achievement of diversity and the remediation of past discrimination as
legitimate objectives, my argument is to recognize a broader mission for
institutions of higher education that allows them to balance exclusivity with
modest outreach to historically underrepresented groups.
E. No Disruption of Settled Expectations
Clearly, context matters. The generalization of the affirmative action
discussion obscures the far less intrusive role of modest affirmative action in the
higher education setting than in fact patterns such as those presented in
Taxnan.59
58 See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
U. CoLO. L. REv. 939, 940 ("Whe diversity rationale is highly problematic and ought not to
be made to stand alone."). Professor Malamud also notes that "It]he [v]ery [p]ermanence of
[d]iversity-[b]ased [a]ffirmative [a]ction [i]s [p]art of the [p]roblem." Id. at 966.
59 The Supreme Court has long distinguished race-based layoff and discharge from
hiring and admissions, and with good reason. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 638 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986)
(plurality opinion); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). In Taxman, by
contrast, the plaintiff invested nine years of her life in the Piscataway school district. See
Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). She may
well have had a property right in her job, protected by the Due Process Clause. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). She
alone bore the cost of the challenged racial preference, and her identity was known before the
decision was made.
By contrast, applicants for admission to universities have no portion of their life invested
in any particular school, no property right in admission, and no right to a hearing on their
application. They can, and most of them do, apply to numerous schools; they cannot
reasonably rely on the prospect of admission to any particular school.
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The costs of affirmative action are spread over a wide pool of applicants,
and for any individual applicant considered e ante, affirmative action has little
effect on the odds of admission. The strongest applicants will be admitted with
or without affirmative action. The marginal applicants would have far less than
an even chance of admission without affirmative action, and only a slightly
lesser chance with affirmative action. After the fact, it is difficult to identify the
particular applicants whose applications were actually affected by affirmative
action. It is appropriate to carefilly define the limits on affirmative action, but
context matters, and the appropriate limits in admissions decisions should not be
nearly so stringent as the appropriate limits in layoff decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION: BAKKE'S LEGACY
Having gone through the Hopwood wars, I found myself, surprisingly, with
new-found respect for Powell's opinion in Bakke.60 1 now understand Bakke to
instruct the universities of this country to proceed with the delicate mission of
integrating higher education, but with extreme attention to the volatility of
excessively apparent racial considerations. Bakke can be seen as deriving a
central lesson from the failure of court-imposed desegregation at the K-12 level.
That lesson is that where the racial considerations in student selection and
assignment are too central, too visible, and too at odds with longstanding
community practices, they are almost certain to fail. Post-Bakke affirmative
action offered an alternative. The premise was that institutions of higher
education were to diminish the visibility of the racial considerations and to keep
the part of the program in which race was dispositive at the margin rather than
the heart of admissions. Under these conditions, courts would look favorably on
a concerted program of increasing minority (and in particular black)
representation in higher education. As we stated in our amicus brief: "Modest
programs are less intrusive not simply because they are less visible, but because
they allow the vast majority of applicants to rest secure in believing that the
60 It is interesting to watch the emergent European Community law evolve toward a
Bakke-like compromise. In Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) read the equal treatment directive as forbidding any preferential treatment of
female applicants, even in industries that had historically been sex-segregated. See Kalanke v.
Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1996 CEC (CCH) 208, 218. The ECJ, following a logic not unlike
the Fifth Circuit's in Hopwood, found the anti-discrimination principle offended by any
manner of differential selection. See id. Two years later, however, in Marschall v. Land
Nordhein-Westfalen, the ECJ changed direction and allowed preferential treatment of women
in historically sex-segregated industries so long as there were objective assessments of the
capabilities of all candidates and so long as there were no positions categorically set aside for
women-an outcome strikingly reminiscent of Bakke. See Marschall v. Land Nordhein-
Westfalen, 1998 CEC (CCH) 152, 166.
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customary returns to achievement, perseverance, and merit will be honored." 61
The result was that for a twenty-five-year period, modest affirmative action
achieved a measure of integration that far outstripped any successes reached by
the more intrusive mechanisms of school busing.62
Were there costs? Certainly. Affirmative action is the product of human
agency and is certain to carry with it the limitations of its creators. That some
schools fashioned programs that were sloppy or simply bad is also unfortunately
and inescapably certain. At some levels of disparity in prior achievement,
admission to competitive institutions is a recipe for failure for students who have
little chance of competing adequately or, in some cases, of even graduating.
Moreover, the difficulties with some programs challenged the integrity of the
university mission that, in our view, could best be protected by affirmative
action. Thus, it is also unfortunately true that some programs bred their own
sources of resentment and facilitated silly challenges to knowledge, standards,
and any conception of merit.
Nonetheless, I am still persuaded that these problems operated at the
margins. The programs were difficult to perfect, but the problem of race is also
difficult.
Ironically, one of the virtues of Bakke could very well portend its undoing.
By lowering the visibility of racial preferences, Bakke allowed its defenders to
try to understate or even deny the realities of the preferences that were
institutionalized. 63 One of the earliest decisions made in the course of the
61 Amici Brief, supra note 36, at *18.
62 A less charitable view would hold that the widespread acceptance of affirmative
action by university administrators allowed hostile views to be silenced. "From its inception,
however, affirmative action has been treated as beyond criticism. People expressing
misgivings have routinely been vilified as self-serving foes of racial equality. Black critics
have tended to be labeled as traitors to their race, whites as promoters of white supremacy."
TMuR KURAN, PRrVATE TRuTHs, PUBLIC LIEs: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFCAnTON 146 (1995). While the defense of affirmative action has no doubt fallen at
times under the unfortunate sway of political correctness, I believe that the combination of
modesty of the programs and the ultimate desirability of the integration of the major
universities is what primarily accounted for the tacit acceptance of these programs.
63 One of the conventions of liberal theory is the belief in the value of "transparency" in
public decisionmaking. See, e.g., JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971)
(describing transparency of allocation systems as a virtue of liberal society). It is noteworthy,
however, that prominent defenders of affirmative action, such as Chris Edley, must
contemplate departures from their normal Rawlsian commitment to publicity in order to
caution that perhaps the workings of affirmative action should not be publicly discussed.
Thus, citing ill-defined "political and social costs," Edley proclaims, "[c]ontroversy has a
price, and divisiveness takes its toll. In race matters, the price may be too high to justify the
supposed benefits of transparency anyway." CHRMISopHER EDLEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND
WHrrE 149 (1997). Such a head-in-the-sand option is not available in the course of litigation.
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Hopwood litigation was also one of the most unavoidable: to be perfectly candid
in admitting that a system of racial preferences was in operation and then
proceeding to explain openly why that was necessary. My final conclusion is
that if affirmative action cannot be defended on this terrain, it cannot be
defended at all.

